In case you have been living under a rock for the last week or so, you may
not have heard about the WMF Windows exploit.

For those rock dwellers, here's the scoop.....short and sweet. Reprinted
here without permission from SANS at
http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?storyid=994. Hope they don't mind.... .

---------------------------------------------

WMF FAQ (NEW)
Published: 2006-01-03,
Last Updated: 2006-01-03 08:55:06 UTC by Johannes Ullrich (Version: 3(click
to highlight changes))

[a few users offered translations of this FAQ into various languages.
Obviously, we can not check the translation for accuracy, nor can we update
them. So use at your own risk: Deutsch and Deutsch (pdf), Catalan , Español
, Italiana and Italiana, Polski, Suomenkielinen, Danish, Japanese,
Slovenian, Chinese, Norwegian and Nederlands (in progress) ]


a.. Why is this issue so important?
The WMF vulnerability uses images (WMF images) to execute arbitrary code. It
will execute just by viewing the image. In most cases, you don't have click
anything. Even images stored on your system may cause the exploit to be
triggered if it is indexed by some indexing software. Viewing a directory in
Explorer with 'Icon size' images will cause the exploit to be triggered as
well.

a.. Is it better to use Firefox or Internet Explorer?
Internet Explorer will view the image and trigger the exploit without
warning. New versions of Firefox will prompt you before opening the image.
However, in most environments this offers little protection given that these
are images and are thus considered 'safe'.

a.. What versions of Windows are affected?
All. Windows 2000, Windows XP, (SP1 and SP2), Windows 2003. All are affected
to some extent. Mac OS-X, Unix or BSD is not affected.

Note: If you're still running on Win98/ME, this is a watershed moment: we
believe (untested) that your system is vulnerable and there will be no patch
from MS. Your mitigation options are very limited. You really need to
upgrade.

a.. What can I do to protect myself?
1.. Microsoft has not yet released a patch. An unofficial patch was made
available by Ilfak Guilfanov. Our own Tom Liston reviewed the patch and we
tested it. The reviewed and tested version is available here (now at v1.4,
MD5: 15f0a36ea33f39c1bcf5a98e51d4f4f6), PGP signature (signed with ISC key)
here. THANKS to Ilfak Guilfanov for providing the patch!!
2.. You can unregister the related DLL.
3.. Virus checkers provide some protection.
To unregister the DLL:

a.. Click Start, click Run, type "regsvr32 -u %windir%system32shimgvw.dll"
(without the quotation marks... our editor keeps swallowing the
backslashes... its %windir%(backslash)system32(backslash)shimgvw.dll) , and
then click OK.
b.. A dialog box appears to confirm that the un-registration process has
succeeded. Click OK to close the dialog box.
Our current "best practice" recommendation is to both unregister the DLL and
to use the unofficial patch.

a.. How does the unofficial patch work?
The wmfhotfix.dll is injected into any process loading user32.dll. The DLL
then patches (in memory) gdi32.dll's Escape() function so that it ignores
any call using the SETABORTPROC (ie. 0x09) parameter. This should allow
Windows programs to display WMF files normally while still blocking the
exploit. The version of the patch located here has been carefully checked
against the source code provided as well as tested against all known
versions of the exploit. It should work on WinXP (SP1 and SP2) and Win2K.

a.. Will unregistering the DLL (without using the unofficial patch)
protect me?
It might help. But it is not foolproof. We want to be very clear on this: we
have some very stong indications that simply unregistering the shimgvw.dll
isn't always successful. The .dll can be re-registered by malicious
processes or other installations, and there may be issues where
re-registering the .dll on a running system that has had an exploit run
against it allowing the exploit to succeed. In addition it might be
possible for there to be other avenues of attack against the Escape()
function in gdi32.dll. Until there is a patch available from MS, we
recommend using the unofficial patch in addition to un-registering
shimgvw.dll.
a.. Should I just delete the DLL?
It might not be a bad idea, but Windows File Protection will probably
replace it. You'll need to turn off Windows File Protection first. Also,
once an official patch is available you'll need to replace the DLL.
(renaming, rather than deleting is probably better so it will still be
handy).

a.. Should I just block all .WMF images?
This may help, but it is not sufficient. WMF files are recognized by a
special header and the extension is not needed. The files could arrive using
any extension, or embeded in Word or other documents.

a.. What is DEP (Data Execution Protection) and how does it help me?
With Windows XP SP2, Microsoft introduced DEP. It protects against a wide
range of exploits, by preventing the execution of 'data segements'. However,
to work well, it requires hardware support. Some CPUs, like AMD's 64 Bit
CPUs, will provide full DEP protection and will prevent the exploit.

a.. How good are Anti Virus products to prevent the exploit?
At this point, we are aware of versions of the exploit that will not be
detected by antivirus engines. We hope they will catch up soon. But it will
be a hard battle to catch all versions of the exploit. Up to date AV systems
are necessary but likely not sufficient.

a.. How could a malicious WMF file enter my system?
There are too many methods to mention them all. E-mail attachments, web
sites, instant messaging are probably the most likely sources. Don't forget
P2P file sharing and other sources.

a.. Is it sufficient to tell my users not to visit untrusted web sites?
No. It helps, but its likely not sufficient. We had at least one widely
trusted web site (knoppix-std.org) which was compromissed. As part of the
compromise, a frame was added to the site redirecting users to a corrupt WMF
file. "Tursted" sites have been used like this in the past.

a.. What is the actual problem with WMF images here?
WMF images are a bit different then most other images. Instead of just
containing simple 'this pixel has that color' information, WMF images can
call external procedures. One of these procedure calls can be used to
execute the code.

a.. Should I use something like "dropmyrights" to lower the impact of an
exploit.
By all means yes. Also, do not run as an administrator level users for every
day work. However, this will only limit the impact of the exploit, and not
prevent it. Also: Web browsing is only one way to trigger the exploit. If
the image is left behind on your system, and later viewed by an
administrator, you may get 'hit'.

a.. Are my servers vulnerable?
Maybe... do you allow the uploading of images? email? Are these images
indexed? Do you sometimes use a web browser on the server? In short: If
someone can get a image to your server, and if the vulnerable DLL may look
at it, your server may very well be vulnerable.

a.. What can I do at my perimeter / firewall to protect my network?
Not much. A proxy server that strips all images from web sites? Probably
wont go over well with your users. At least block .WMF images (see above
about extensions...). If your proxy has some kind of virus checker, it may
catch it. Same for mail servers. The less you allow your users to initiate
outbound connections, the better. Close monitoring of user workstations may
provide a hint if a work station is infected.

a.. Can I use an IDS to detect the exploit?
Most IDS vendors are working on signatures. Contact your vendor for details.
Bleedingsnort.org is providing some continuosly improving signatures for
snort users.

a.. If I get hit by the exploit, what can I do?
Not much :-(. It very much depends on the exact exploit you are hit with.
Most of them will download additional components. It can be very hard, or
even impossible, to find all the pieces. Microsoft offers free support for
issues like that at 866-727-2389 (866 PC SAFETY).

a.. Does Microsoft have information available?
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sec...ry/912840.mspx
But there is no patch at the time of this writing.


a.. What does CERT have to say?
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/181038
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cve...=CVE-2005-4560


-----------------------------------------

So run the patch, reboot and keep your fingers crossed!

Jim

Direct link to patch......
http://handlers.sans.org/tliston/wmffix_hexblog14.exe

MS has updated their security advisory to indicate the patch is expected to
be released on the next patch Tuesday, Jan 10th.
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sec...ry/912840.mspx

Tom
"Jim" <reply@groups.please> wrote in message
news:vLtuf.37301$Lb1.28425@bignews3.bellsouth.net. ..
| In case you have been living under a rock for the last week or so, you may
| not have heard about the WMF Windows exploit.
|
| For those rock dwellers, here's the scoop.....short and sweet. Reprinted
| here without permission from SANS at
| http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?storyid=994. Hope they don't mind.... .
|
| ---------------------------------------------
|
| WMF FAQ (NEW)
| Published: 2006-01-03,
| Last Updated: 2006-01-03 08:55:06 UTC by Johannes Ullrich (Version:
3(click
| to highlight changes))
|
| [a few users offered translations of this FAQ into various languages.
| Obviously, we can not check the translation for accuracy, nor can we
update
| them. So use at your own risk: Deutsch and Deutsch (pdf), Catalan ,
Español
| , Italiana and Italiana, Polski, Suomenkielinen, Danish, Japanese,
| Slovenian, Chinese, Norwegian and Nederlands (in progress) ]
|
|
| a.. Why is this issue so important?
| The WMF vulnerability uses images (WMF images) to execute arbitrary code.
It
| will execute just by viewing the image. In most cases, you don't have
click
| anything. Even images stored on your system may cause the exploit to be
| triggered if it is indexed by some indexing software. Viewing a directory
in
| Explorer with 'Icon size' images will cause the exploit to be triggered as
| well.
|
| a.. Is it better to use Firefox or Internet Explorer?
| Internet Explorer will view the image and trigger the exploit without
| warning. New versions of Firefox will prompt you before opening the image.
| However, in most environments this offers little protection given that
these
| are images and are thus considered 'safe'.
|
| a.. What versions of Windows are affected?
| All. Windows 2000, Windows XP, (SP1 and SP2), Windows 2003. All are
affected
| to some extent. Mac OS-X, Unix or BSD is not affected.
|
| Note: If you're still running on Win98/ME, this is a watershed moment: we
| believe (untested) that your system is vulnerable and there will be no
patch
| from MS. Your mitigation options are very limited. You really need to
| upgrade.
|
| a.. What can I do to protect myself?
| 1.. Microsoft has not yet released a patch. An unofficial patch was made
| available by Ilfak Guilfanov. Our own Tom Liston reviewed the patch and we
| tested it. The reviewed and tested version is available here (now at v1.4,
| MD5: 15f0a36ea33f39c1bcf5a98e51d4f4f6), PGP signature (signed with ISC
key)
| here. THANKS to Ilfak Guilfanov for providing the patch!!
| 2.. You can unregister the related DLL.
| 3.. Virus checkers provide some protection.
| To unregister the DLL:
|
| a.. Click Start, click Run, type "regsvr32 -u
%windir%system32shimgvw.dll"
| (without the quotation marks... our editor keeps swallowing the
| backslashes... its %windir%(backslash)system32(backslash)shimgvw.dll) , and
| then click OK.
| b.. A dialog box appears to confirm that the un-registration process has
| succeeded. Click OK to close the dialog box.
| Our current "best practice" recommendation is to both unregister the DLL
and
| to use the unofficial patch.
|
| a.. How does the unofficial patch work?
| The wmfhotfix.dll is injected into any process loading user32.dll. The
DLL
| then patches (in memory) gdi32.dll's Escape() function so that it ignores
| any call using the SETABORTPROC (ie. 0x09) parameter. This should allow
| Windows programs to display WMF files normally while still blocking the
| exploit. The version of the patch located here has been carefully checked
| against the source code provided as well as tested against all known
| versions of the exploit. It should work on WinXP (SP1 and SP2) and Win2K.
|
| a.. Will unregistering the DLL (without using the unofficial patch)
| protect me?
| It might help. But it is not foolproof. We want to be very clear on this:
we
| have some very stong indications that simply unregistering the shimgvw.dll
| isn't always successful. The .dll can be re-registered by malicious
| processes or other installations, and there may be issues where
| re-registering the .dll on a running system that has had an exploit run
| against it allowing the exploit to succeed. In addition it might be
| possible for there to be other avenues of attack against the Escape()
| function in gdi32.dll. Until there is a patch available from MS, we
| recommend using the unofficial patch in addition to un-registering
| shimgvw.dll.
| a.. Should I just delete the DLL?
| It might not be a bad idea, but Windows File Protection will probably
| replace it. You'll need to turn off Windows File Protection first. Also,
| once an official patch is available you'll need to replace the DLL.
| (renaming, rather than deleting is probably better so it will still be
| handy).
|
| a.. Should I just block all .WMF images?
| This may help, but it is not sufficient. WMF files are recognized by a
| special header and the extension is not needed. The files could arrive
using
| any extension, or embeded in Word or other documents.
|
| a.. What is DEP (Data Execution Protection) and how does it help me?
| With Windows XP SP2, Microsoft introduced DEP. It protects against a wide
| range of exploits, by preventing the execution of 'data segements'.
However,
| to work well, it requires hardware support. Some CPUs, like AMD's 64 Bit
| CPUs, will provide full DEP protection and will prevent the exploit.
|
| a.. How good are Anti Virus products to prevent the exploit?
| At this point, we are aware of versions of the exploit that will not be
| detected by antivirus engines. We hope they will catch up soon. But it
will
| be a hard battle to catch all versions of the exploit. Up to date AV
systems
| are necessary but likely not sufficient.
|
| a.. How could a malicious WMF file enter my system?
| There are too many methods to mention them all. E-mail attachments, web
| sites, instant messaging are probably the most likely sources. Don't
forget
| P2P file sharing and other sources.
|
| a.. Is it sufficient to tell my users not to visit untrusted web sites?
| No. It helps, but its likely not sufficient. We had at least one widely
| trusted web site (knoppix-std.org) which was compromissed. As part of the
| compromise, a frame was added to the site redirecting users to a corrupt
WMF
| file. "Tursted" sites have been used like this in the past.
|
| a.. What is the actual problem with WMF images here?
| WMF images are a bit different then most other images. Instead of just
| containing simple 'this pixel has that color' information, WMF images can
| call external procedures. One of these procedure calls can be used to
| execute the code.
|
| a.. Should I use something like "dropmyrights" to lower the impact of an
| exploit.
| By all means yes. Also, do not run as an administrator level users for
every
| day work. However, this will only limit the impact of the exploit, and not
| prevent it. Also: Web browsing is only one way to trigger the exploit. If
| the image is left behind on your system, and later viewed by an
| administrator, you may get 'hit'.
|
| a.. Are my servers vulnerable?
| Maybe... do you allow the uploading of images? email? Are these images
| indexed? Do you sometimes use a web browser on the server? In short: If
| someone can get a image to your server, and if the vulnerable DLL may look
| at it, your server may very well be vulnerable.
|
| a.. What can I do at my perimeter / firewall to protect my network?
| Not much. A proxy server that strips all images from web sites? Probably
| wont go over well with your users. At least block .WMF images (see above
| about extensions...). If your proxy has some kind of virus checker, it may
| catch it. Same for mail servers. The less you allow your users to initiate
| outbound connections, the better. Close monitoring of user workstations
may
| provide a hint if a work station is infected.
|
| a.. Can I use an IDS to detect the exploit?
| Most IDS vendors are working on signatures. Contact your vendor for
details.
| Bleedingsnort.org is providing some continuosly improving signatures for
| snort users.
|
| a.. If I get hit by the exploit, what can I do?
| Not much :-(. It very much depends on the exact exploit you are hit with.
| Most of them will download additional components. It can be very hard, or
| even impossible, to find all the pieces. Microsoft offers free support for
| issues like that at 866-727-2389 (866 PC SAFETY).
|
| a.. Does Microsoft have information available?
| http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sec...ry/912840.mspx
| But there is no patch at the time of this writing.
|
|
| a.. What does CERT have to say?
| http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/181038
| http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cve...=CVE-2005-4560
|
|
| -----------------------------------------
|
| So run the patch, reboot and keep your fingers crossed!
|
| Jim
|
|

Thanks for the update.....meanwhile, run the patch on the SANS site or
you're open to anything.

Direct link to patch......
http://handlers.sans.org/tliston/wmffix_hexblog14.exe

Jim

"Tom [Pepper] Willett" <tompepper@mvps.invalid> wrote in message
news:%23qOHw%23GEGHA.3148@TK2MSFTNGP10.phx.gbl...
> MS has updated their security advisory to indicate the patch is expected
> to
> be released on the next patch Tuesday, Jan 10th.
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sec...ry/912840.mspx
>
> Tom
> "Jim" <reply@groups.please> wrote in message
> news:vLtuf.37301$Lb1.28425@bignews3.bellsouth.net. ..
> | In case you have been living under a rock for the last week or so, you
> may
> | not have heard about the WMF Windows exploit.
> |
> | For those rock dwellers, here's the scoop.....short and sweet.
> Reprinted
> | here without permission from SANS at
> | http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?storyid=994. Hope they don't mind.... .
> |
> | ---------------------------------------------
> |
> | WMF FAQ (NEW)
> | Published: 2006-01-03,
> | Last Updated: 2006-01-03 08:55:06 UTC by Johannes Ullrich (Version:
> 3(click
> | to highlight changes))
> |
> | [a few users offered translations of this FAQ into various languages.
> | Obviously, we can not check the translation for accuracy, nor can we
> update
> | them. So use at your own risk: Deutsch and Deutsch (pdf), Catalan ,
> Español
> | , Italiana and Italiana, Polski, Suomenkielinen, Danish, Japanese,
> | Slovenian, Chinese, Norwegian and Nederlands (in progress) ]
> |
> |
> | a.. Why is this issue so important?
> | The WMF vulnerability uses images (WMF images) to execute arbitrary
> code.
> It
> | will execute just by viewing the image. In most cases, you don't have
> click
> | anything. Even images stored on your system may cause the exploit to be
> | triggered if it is indexed by some indexing software. Viewing a
> directory
> in
> | Explorer with 'Icon size' images will cause the exploit to be triggered
> as
> | well.
> |
> | a.. Is it better to use Firefox or Internet Explorer?
> | Internet Explorer will view the image and trigger the exploit without
> | warning. New versions of Firefox will prompt you before opening the
> image.
> | However, in most environments this offers little protection given that
> these
> | are images and are thus considered 'safe'.
> |
> | a.. What versions of Windows are affected?
> | All. Windows 2000, Windows XP, (SP1 and SP2), Windows 2003. All are
> affected
> | to some extent. Mac OS-X, Unix or BSD is not affected.
> |
> | Note: If you're still running on Win98/ME, this is a watershed moment:
> we
> | believe (untested) that your system is vulnerable and there will be no
> patch
> | from MS. Your mitigation options are very limited. You really need to
> | upgrade.
> |
> | a.. What can I do to protect myself?
> | 1.. Microsoft has not yet released a patch. An unofficial patch was
> made
> | available by Ilfak Guilfanov. Our own Tom Liston reviewed the patch and
> we
> | tested it. The reviewed and tested version is available here (now at
> v1.4,
> | MD5: 15f0a36ea33f39c1bcf5a98e51d4f4f6), PGP signature (signed with ISC
> key)
> | here. THANKS to Ilfak Guilfanov for providing the patch!!
> | 2.. You can unregister the related DLL.
> | 3.. Virus checkers provide some protection.
> | To unregister the DLL:
> |
> | a.. Click Start, click Run, type "regsvr32 -u
> %windir%system32shimgvw.dll"
> | (without the quotation marks... our editor keeps swallowing the
> | backslashes... its %windir%(backslash)system32(backslash)shimgvw.dll) ,
> and
> | then click OK.
> | b.. A dialog box appears to confirm that the un-registration process
> has
> | succeeded. Click OK to close the dialog box.
> | Our current "best practice" recommendation is to both unregister the DLL
> and
> | to use the unofficial patch.
> |
> | a.. How does the unofficial patch work?
> | The wmfhotfix.dll is injected into any process loading user32.dll. The
> DLL
> | then patches (in memory) gdi32.dll's Escape() function so that it
> ignores
> | any call using the SETABORTPROC (ie. 0x09) parameter. This should allow
> | Windows programs to display WMF files normally while still blocking the
> | exploit. The version of the patch located here has been carefully
> checked
> | against the source code provided as well as tested against all known
> | versions of the exploit. It should work on WinXP (SP1 and SP2) and
> Win2K.
> |
> | a.. Will unregistering the DLL (without using the unofficial patch)
> | protect me?
> | It might help. But it is not foolproof. We want to be very clear on
> this:
> we
> | have some very stong indications that simply unregistering the
> shimgvw.dll
> | isn't always successful. The .dll can be re-registered by malicious
> | processes or other installations, and there may be issues where
> | re-registering the .dll on a running system that has had an exploit run
> | against it allowing the exploit to succeed. In addition it might be
> | possible for there to be other avenues of attack against the Escape()
> | function in gdi32.dll. Until there is a patch available from MS, we
> | recommend using the unofficial patch in addition to un-registering
> | shimgvw.dll.
> | a.. Should I just delete the DLL?
> | It might not be a bad idea, but Windows File Protection will probably
> | replace it. You'll need to turn off Windows File Protection first. Also,
> | once an official patch is available you'll need to replace the DLL.
> | (renaming, rather than deleting is probably better so it will still be
> | handy).
> |
> | a.. Should I just block all .WMF images?
> | This may help, but it is not sufficient. WMF files are recognized by a
> | special header and the extension is not needed. The files could arrive
> using
> | any extension, or embeded in Word or other documents.
> |
> | a.. What is DEP (Data Execution Protection) and how does it help me?
> | With Windows XP SP2, Microsoft introduced DEP. It protects against a
> wide
> | range of exploits, by preventing the execution of 'data segements'.
> However,
> | to work well, it requires hardware support. Some CPUs, like AMD's 64 Bit
> | CPUs, will provide full DEP protection and will prevent the exploit.
> |
> | a.. How good are Anti Virus products to prevent the exploit?
> | At this point, we are aware of versions of the exploit that will not be
> | detected by antivirus engines. We hope they will catch up soon. But it
> will
> | be a hard battle to catch all versions of the exploit. Up to date AV
> systems
> | are necessary but likely not sufficient.
> |
> | a.. How could a malicious WMF file enter my system?
> | There are too many methods to mention them all. E-mail attachments, web
> | sites, instant messaging are probably the most likely sources. Don't
> forget
> | P2P file sharing and other sources.
> |
> | a.. Is it sufficient to tell my users not to visit untrusted web sites?
> | No. It helps, but its likely not sufficient. We had at least one widely
> | trusted web site (knoppix-std.org) which was compromissed. As part of
> the
> | compromise, a frame was added to the site redirecting users to a corrupt
> WMF
> | file. "Tursted" sites have been used like this in the past.
> |
> | a.. What is the actual problem with WMF images here?
> | WMF images are a bit different then most other images. Instead of just
> | containing simple 'this pixel has that color' information, WMF images
> can
> | call external procedures. One of these procedure calls can be used to
> | execute the code.
> |
> | a.. Should I use something like "dropmyrights" to lower the impact of
> an
> | exploit.
> | By all means yes. Also, do not run as an administrator level users for
> every
> | day work. However, this will only limit the impact of the exploit, and
> not
> | prevent it. Also: Web browsing is only one way to trigger the exploit.
> If
> | the image is left behind on your system, and later viewed by an
> | administrator, you may get 'hit'.
> |
> | a.. Are my servers vulnerable?
> | Maybe... do you allow the uploading of images? email? Are these images
> | indexed? Do you sometimes use a web browser on the server? In short: If
> | someone can get a image to your server, and if the vulnerable DLL may
> look
> | at it, your server may very well be vulnerable.
> |
> | a.. What can I do at my perimeter / firewall to protect my network?
> | Not much. A proxy server that strips all images from web sites? Probably
> | wont go over well with your users. At least block .WMF images (see
> above
> | about extensions...). If your proxy has some kind of virus checker, it
> may
> | catch it. Same for mail servers. The less you allow your users to
> initiate
> | outbound connections, the better. Close monitoring of user workstations
> may
> | provide a hint if a work station is infected.
> |
> | a.. Can I use an IDS to detect the exploit?
> | Most IDS vendors are working on signatures. Contact your vendor for
> details.
> | Bleedingsnort.org is providing some continuosly improving signatures for
> | snort users.
> |
> | a.. If I get hit by the exploit, what can I do?
> | Not much :-(. It very much depends on the exact exploit you are hit
> with.
> | Most of them will download additional components. It can be very hard,
> or
> | even impossible, to find all the pieces. Microsoft offers free support
> for
> | issues like that at 866-727-2389 (866 PC SAFETY).
> |
> | a.. Does Microsoft have information available?
> | http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sec...ry/912840.mspx
> | But there is no patch at the time of this writing.
> |
> |
> | a.. What does CERT have to say?
> | http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/181038
> | http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cve...=CVE-2005-4560
> |
> |
> | -----------------------------------------
> |
> | So run the patch, reboot and keep your fingers crossed!
> |
> | Jim
> |
> |
>
>

Microsoft has not released a patch at this point. Please do not download or
install a patch from any other source.
--
Chris H.
Microsoft Windows MVP/Tablet PC
Tablet Creations - http://nicecreations.us/
Associate Expert
Expert Zone - www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/expertzone

Chris,

You are acting in an extremely irresponsible manner. This is one of the
largest exploits ever to hit the Windows platform (in number of machines
affected), and you are telling people to do nothing.

The only thing more irresponsible than your post is Microsoft's refusal
to take immediate action for such an exploit.

Jim

"Chris H." <winxpnews@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:um047fHEGHA.140@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl...
> Microsoft has not released a patch at this point. Please do not download
> or install a patch from any other source.
> --
> Chris H.
> Microsoft Windows MVP/Tablet PC
> Tablet Creations - http://nicecreations.us/
> Associate Expert
> Expert Zone - www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/expertzone
>
>

The patch works fine. I have installed it on my three computers without any
problem. Even if it caused a couple of glitches, it is better than having
your computer taken over, and controlled, by an unknown individual.

--


Regards,

Richard Urban
Microsoft MVP Windows Shell/User

Quote from George Ankner:
If you knew as much as you think you know,
You would realize that you don't know what you thought you knew!

"Chris H." <winxpnews@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:um047fHEGHA.140@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl...
> Microsoft has not released a patch at this point. Please do not download
> or install a patch from any other source.
> --
> Chris H.
> Microsoft Windows MVP/Tablet PC
> Tablet Creations - http://nicecreations.us/
> Associate Expert
> Expert Zone - www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/expertzone
>
>

Jim wrote:
> Chris,
>
> You are acting in an extremely irresponsible manner. This is one of the
> largest exploits ever to hit the Windows platform (in number of machines
> affected), and you are telling people to do nothing.
>
> The only thing more irresponsible than your post is Microsoft's refusal
> to take immediate action for such an exploit.

Microsoft is taking action. They have posted an advisory which includes
steps that can be taken to decrease the likelihood of a system falling
prey to this vulnerability. A patch has been developed by MS and is now
in the process of being validated to insure that it meets their release
standards. The MS patch has a tentative release date of January 10,
2006, one week from today.

As most AV vendors now guard against any attack of this vulnerability,
keeping your AV signatures up to date will keep you protected. If,
after gathering all information on this you feel you are still at risk,
then installing the patch available on the SANS website will add
additional protection. Understand though that the SANS patch has not
gone through the same level of testing that the MS patch will have gone
through so has the potential of causing problems.

In the past, files have been offered as patches to vulnerabilities that
were themselves an exploit of some sort. It is always best to be wary
of patches from any non-verifiable source.
--
Tom Porterfield
MS-MVP Windows
http://support.teloep.org

Please post all follow-ups to the newsgroup only.

Incorrect, Jim. Users should wait for the official patch, and not risk (1)
going to some web site not connected with Microsoft, and (2) not installing
some "patch" or other software on their machine from an unknown source.

As noted in the security bulletin issued, there are specific instances where
this violation of a computer can take place, and they include being lured to
a web site.

Protection of the computer will come with intelligent computer usage,
including not visiting an unknown site for a "fix" not coming directly from
Microsoft.
--
Chris H.
Microsoft Windows MVP/Tablet PC
Tablet Creations - http://nicecreations.us/
Associate Expert
Expert Zone - www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/expertzone


"Jim" <reply@groups.please> wrote in message
news:kMwuf.37341$Lb1.8673@bignews3.bellsouth.net.. .
> Chris,
>
> You are acting in an extremely irresponsible manner. This is one of
> the largest exploits ever to hit the Windows platform (in number of
> machines affected), and you are telling people to do nothing.
>
> The only thing more irresponsible than your post is Microsoft's refusal
> to take immediate action for such an exploit.
>
> Jim
>
> "Chris H." <winxpnews@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:um047fHEGHA.140@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl...
>> Microsoft has not released a patch at this point. Please do not download
>> or install a patch from any other source.
>> --
>> Chris H.
>> Microsoft Windows MVP/Tablet PC
>> Tablet Creations - http://nicecreations.us/
>> Associate Expert
>> Expert Zone - www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/expertzone
>>
>>
>
>

"Tom Porterfield" <tpporter@mvps.org> wrote in message
news:e8ziw6HEGHA.140@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl...
> Jim wrote:
>> Chris,
>>
>> You are acting in an extremely irresponsible manner. This is one of
>> the largest exploits ever to hit the Windows platform (in number of
>> machines affected), and you are telling people to do nothing.
>>
>> The only thing more irresponsible than your post is Microsoft's
>> refusal to take immediate action for such an exploit.
>
> Microsoft is taking action. They have posted an advisory which includes
> steps that can be taken to decrease the likelihood of a system falling
> prey to this vulnerability. A patch has been developed by MS and is now
> in the process of being validated to insure that it meets their release
> standards. The MS patch has a tentative release date of January 10, 2006,
> one week from today.

One week is a very long time with an exploit like this circulating. Not
only can the exploit be used to take over your PC and execute virtually any
code that the attacker wants....the exploit is so simple that any script
kiddie can do it - and lots of them are.

From Symantec's website.... "It has been reported that the following Web
sites may contain malicious files that trigger the exploit:


a.. [http://]h0nest.org/[REMOVED]/12.exe (IP address 195.0.210.192)
a.. [http://]kube.isa-geek.com/[REMOVED]/wen/up.exe (IP address not found)
a.. [http://]charmedmadgic.free.fr/[REMOVED]/sdbot05b.jpg (IP address
212.27.63.117)
a.. [http://]69.50.171.122/[REMOVED]/test1.php
a.. [http://]www.jerrynews.com/[REMOVED]/calc.exe (IP address
211.100.26.169)
a.. [http://]apperception.biz/[REMOVED]/main.exe (IP address 66.226.64.19)
a.. [http://]apperception.biz/[REMOVED]/calc.exe (IP address 66.226.64.19)
a.. [http://]sploso.com/[REMOVED]/starter2.exe (IP address 72.5.54.36)
a.. [ftp://]x.www2.ninoa.com/[REMOVED]/pub/ied.exe (IP address
205.177.28.180)
a.. [ftp://]x.www2.ninoa.com/[REMOVED]/pub/epl.exe (IP address
205.177.28.180)
a.. [http://]www.freecat.biz/[REMOVED]/tr/pawn005.exe (IP address not found)
a.. [http://]fullchain.net/[REMOVED]/apa/dex.exe (IP address
192.225.177.21)"

>
> As most AV vendors now guard against any attack of this vulnerability,
> keeping your AV signatures up to date will keep you protected. If, after
> gathering all information on this you feel you are still at risk, then
> installing the patch available on the SANS website will add additional
> protection. Understand though that the SANS patch has not gone through
> the same level of testing that the MS patch will have gone through so has
> the potential of causing problems.

I'd rather be safe than sorry. Some Antivirus products have been updated to
catch the 2 variants that have appeared at first. But, as I am sure that
you are aware, variants of exploits rarely stop at 2 code variants.

>
> In the past, files have been offered as patches to vulnerabilities that
> were themselves an exploit of some sort. It is always best to be wary of
> patches from any non-verifiable source.

Users should always be wary of executing ANY code on thier systems. Only
run code from trusted sources. That is why I gave the SANS link instead of
my company website. SANS is more widely known and has a history of
trustworthiness that a small company like mine has yet to attain.

While I understand your sketicism and applaude your watchful eye for any
code that will run on your system. We should also take any means nec. to
ensure the protection of the masses.

More people than you think do not have up-to-date antivirus protection.
This is not to say that this tool in any way negates the need for such
protection. Rather it is a stop-gap measure that will offer a measure of
protection, to those willing to take advantage of it, until Microsoft is
comfortable releasing thier patch.

Thanks for your feedback.

Jim